Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

7 May 2018

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Second session
Geneva, 23 April–4 May 2018

New Agenda Coalition comments on Draft Chair's factual summary (NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/CRP.3)

Working paper submitted by New Zealand on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition*

Thank you Mr Chair.

I am taking the floor on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition, comprising Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, South Africa and my own country New Zealand.

Our delegations would certainly wish to congratulate you on your chairmanship of this Second Preparatory Committee meeting. We are also grateful for your efforts, those of your team and of the Secretariat, in pulling together your draft factual summary in CRP.3. We recognise that your summary is submitted to this Conference under your own authority and that you have signalled that you do not intend to make any substantive changes to it.

We would, however, like to put on record our Coalition's key concerns with your text. As a general point, we note that it is important that your text fully reflect the range of views expressed by all delegations over the last two weeks here. In this regard:

- We note with concern the emphasis in paragraph 7 on the need to "safeguard gains" made under the NPT, inter alia, in disarmament. We are concerned, Mr Chair, that this might suggest that the primary focus of States Parties in going forward now on disarmament is to safeguard what has already been done. The NAC's view, mirrored we believe by the overwhelming majority of States Parties here, is that there have been insufficient gains in the NPT's disarmament pillar and that it is this which must be addressed urgently.
- Further, with regard still to paragraph 7, we note that there is a reference to the need to identify areas of common ground before pathways for the further implementation of the Treaty can be pursued. In fact, Mr Chair, pathways for further implementation of the Treaty have already been established and agreed to by all in 1995, 2000 and 2010.

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- We note that paragraph 8 has a reference to the need to "create the conditions conducive to further nuclear disarmament". This is an area of considerable contention among NPT States Parties and should have included a reference to the opposition of a significant number of States Parties to such a reference. (One way to do so would have been along the lines of the final sentence in paragraph 14 which notes that a particular view was not shared by a group of states.)

- We regret that, in paragraph 12, the text of the unequivocal undertaking given by nuclear-weapon States has not been reflected fully. Here, the unequivocal undertaking has been reframed to take "into account the special responsibility of States possessing the largest nuclear arsenals". Instead, Mr Chair, we note that the unequivocal undertaking given in 2000, and reaffirmed in 2010, is "to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament to which all States Parties are committed under Article VI".

- In paragraph 19, Mr Chair, your placement of the word "some" when referencing "nuclear weapon States' modernisation programmes" suggests that there are some nuclear weapon modernisation programmes that are consistent with NPT undertakings and the object and purpose of the Treaty. Any such view is contested by many States Parties here.

- With respect to paragraph 29 regarding the operational status of nuclear weapon systems, we believe this language is unacceptably weak. Suggesting that nuclear weapon States were only called upon, "where possible", to further reduce alert levels does not reflect the strong calls made in this room for the de-alerting of nuclear weapons.

- We regret the omission in any of the four paragraphs dealing with nuclear testing and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty to the importance of maintaining existing moratoriums on nuclear weapon test explosions pending the entry into force of that Treaty.

- Mr Chair, of deep concern to the NAC, is the lack of balance in the language referencing the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. There are two paragraphs dealing with this important Treaty. One paragraph (paragraph 41), notes that some States Parties expressed their opposition to the TPNW. In contrast, the other paragraph (paragraph 40) does not note the support of many, or indeed any, States for this Treaty. Instead, it simply notes the conclusion of the Treaty (without welcoming this) and notes that a number of States Parties provided information about its "ratification process and status".

- Further, the framing of the reference at the end of paragraph 40 to the intention of the TPNW to strengthen existing disarmament and non-proliferation regime is unacceptable. In fact, it was widely observed at this PrepCom that the TPNW will strengthen the NPT regime.

Mr Chair, we intend to submit these comments, which are delivered on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition, to the Secretariat in the form of a working document.

Thank you.

Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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Comments on the Chair's summary (NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/CRP.3)

Working paper submitted by Brazil*

Brazil would like to register the following comments on the substance and structure of document (NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/CRP.3):

- Cannot agree with all uses of "States parties" formulations throughout the document, if intended to indicate areas of agreement or consensus.
- References to stability in para 1 and in other paras not acceptable as NPT does not include stability as condition for the fulfillment of its obligations.
- The idea of a "recommitment" RevCon in 2020 in para 6 requires further discussion.
- There is urgent need to disarm, not to "safeguard gains made in disarmament" as inadequately stated in para 7.
- There is a missing reference to INFCIR/540 (corrected) in para 6 as a requirement for non-NPT nuclear possessing states. It was present in last years' factual summary. On the other hand, there is an inadequate attempt to imply the AP, together with comprehensive safeguards, is some sort of new standard under the NPT. The last phrase of para 53, to this effect, is inaccurate and, therefore, unacceptable. Consolidated language in IAEA resolutions on safeguards states unequivocally that "in the case of a State with a comprehensive safeguards agreement supplemented by an additional protocol in force, these measures represent the enhanced verification standard for that State".
- Creating conditions for further progress on nuclear disarmament is not a treaty backed concept and should be suppressed. It is a minority view, at best, and cannot not be as prominently captured.
- Gender concerns were expressed with a view to enhancing women's participation in disarmament because there is a deficit. The intention was not to refer to women as if their role currently already equates with that of men, as para 10 seems to imply.

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- Brazil proposes harmonizing references to disarmament, non-proliferation and peaceful uses, in this order, as it appears in para 78, for example, and not in a reversed order as it appears in para 10, for example.
- "Elimination of nuclear arsenals" in para 12; does not fully translate the NPT's obligation on disarmament. The concept of disarmament per se needs to be adhered to.
- The principle of equal and undiminished security for all, as it appears in para 14, has been previously expressed as increased and undiminished security for all. There is no consensus on changed formulations.
- It should not be the prerogative of NWS to nominally register their opposition to specific issues, as in para 15, especially when none of the oppositions of other states parties to other formulations has been captured in the remainder of the text.
- Expression of "concern" in para 15 is too soft.
- Call to "refrain" in para 16 is also too soft.
- Para 19 attempts to reconcile opposing narratives. But one of them, regarding a continued role for credible nuclear deterrence, is not backed by the treat and not supported by the majority.
- Several delegations stated that there is a new qualitative nuclear arms race currently at play, which threatens the NPT acquis both in disarmament and non-proliferation. The reference in the same para to only "some" modernizations programs being inconsistent with the NPT is not enough: any modernization program would be contrary to the Treaty's purposes and objectives.
- This trend is compounded by the persistent lack of implementation of Article 6 and related commitments agreed to in 1995, 2000 and 2010, which has been referred to by a vast number of delegations, but has not been explicitly reflected in the Chair's summary.
- We are deeply concerned with the tendency to promote an underlying narrative which opposes disarmament to security and indirectly gives credence to the validity, questioned by several delegations, of the logic behind deterrence doctrines.
- The NPT is not a Treaty on deterrence; rather, the rationale behind it is that nuclear weapons are Jangerous and destabilizing. Why else would States parties agree not to pursue them and, for those who already had them, to disarm.
- Individualized paras for each of the five NWS to state their views is a privilege not extended to NNWS and should be reconsidered.
- Risk reduction is not yet a consensus area for consideration in 2020, as seems to imply para 29. To call NWS to take risk-reduction measures, "where possible", seems to suggest we agree there are areas where this is not possible.
- Credible verification and compliance mechanism for nuclear disarmament can be considered an effective measure under Article VI if implemented within a framework of legally binding disarmament obligations and commitments.
- Reference to "national security considerations" in para 30 on IPNDV is unclear and seems inappropriate.
- Urgency of bringing CTBT into force should be attributable to "States Parties", as it is a sentiment shared by all.
- Cannot agree with formulation in para 34, which seems to imply an obligation only for CTBT signatories and ratifying countries to upholding the CTBT normative without the treaty having entered into force.

- The potential of an FMT also attaches to nuclear disarmament, encompassing existing stocks, and this should be stated in para 35.
- The view on para 37 that a moratorium on the production of FM dos not have a clear-cut definition requires further clarification.
- The comprehensive convention approach to nuclear disarmament in para 38, and the progressive approach in para 39 and then the reference to the TPNW in para 40 are clearly unbalanced, and do not reflect the gist of statements.
- Reference to TNPW in para 40 falls short. Several delegations made extensive references to the treaty, its content and relevance. We need to do justice to actual statements made in the plenary.
- Agreement on the establishment of subsidiary bodies of the RevCon as suggested in para 43 requires a broader view of the conference.
- In para 44, the word encourage is too soft, NWS should be "called upon" to review or withdraw their reservations on security assurances given to NWFZ.
- We appreciate the presentation on the Group of Eminent Persons, but cannot "welcome" it, as in para 45, while only noting the TPNW in para 40.
- With regard to the paragraphs on non-proliferation and the application of safeguards, we are disappointed to find no mention of ABACC, a widely recognized contribution to non-proliferation, safety and security, and a unique and effective model for bilateral cooperation on nuclear safeguarding.
- The primary responsibility of the UNSC regarding compliance issues of the NPT is shared with the General Assembly. This reference needs to corrected, as per agreed language of the 2010 RevCon. Or, alternatively, specifically associated with Article X only.
- Limitations and restrictions on exports, as referenced in para 74, also needs to be linked with the inalienable rights of NNWS of the NPT to develop, research, production and use of nuclear energy, as in para 93.
- Contributions of NWFZ to disarmament and non-proliferation should be welcomed, not just "emphasized", as in para 77.
- Final phrase of para 84, establishing conditions for a MEZFNW is possibly the point of view of only one state party and needs to be toned down accordingly.
- Strong support for JCPOA, mentioned in para 88, was in fact an overwhelming support, and was not simply a reiteration, it was a strongly expressed view that relates with the current circumstances.
- There is an unwarranted conditioning of the right to peaceful uses in the final phrase of para 93, which places international cooperation agreements and arrangements above the right of states parties to their choices and decisions in the field of peaceful uses.
- Brazil spoke against a more flexible approach to Review Conference outcome documents in para 114. We stand ready to further discuss these and other organizational issues constructively.
- We reiterate that accepting a clear prohibition of nuclear weapons under the TPNW, and working towards its strengthening and implementation, is the new standard for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, including in respect of nuclear safety and security.

Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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Chair's factual summary (working paper)*

1. States parties reaffirmed their commitment to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and full compliance with all the Treaty's provisions. States parties reaffirmed the status of the NPT as the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation regime, the foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament, and an important element in facilitating the benefits of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. They stressed the essential role of the Treaty in the maintenance of international peace, security and stability, and the achievement of a world free of nuclear weapons, as well as its centrality to the rules-based international order.

2. Recognizing their mutually reinforcing nature, States parties also reaffirmed their commitment to the complete and balanced implementation of, and compliance with, all Articles of the NPT. They noted that balanced implementation of the Treaty is vital to its effective functioning and credibility.

3. In this context, the necessity was underlined of fully and effectively implementing the decisions and the resolution adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, and the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions of the 2010 Review Conference, including the action plan. The importance of continued efforts to implement these commitments was stressed.

4. States parties agreed that the 2020 Review Conference, which marks the fiftieth anniversary of the entry into force of the Treaty, provides an opportunity to reaffirm their commitment to the Treaty, commemorate the historic achievements of the NPT, review and assess the implementation of all three pillars of the Treaty, as well as commitments made at its Review Conferences, and to chart a practical and positive course to the achievement of the objectives of the Treaty, including a world without nuclear weapons. States parties committed themselves to making all efforts to achieve a successful outcome at the 2020 Review Conference.

5. In this context, recommendations were made for possible consideration and adoption at the 2020 Review Conference. The opinion was expressed that the 2020 Review Conference should be a review and recommitment conference. Support was registered for a consensual outcome document to result from the meeting.

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6. States parties stressed the importance of achieving universal adherence to the Treaty. They again called upon India, Israel and Pakistan to accede to the treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States, without further delay and without any conditions, and to bring into force the required comprehensive safeguards agreements. States parties also called on South Sudan to accede to the Treaty.

7. States parties noted that since the 2017 session of the Preparatory Committee, the international security environment had deteriorated and become more complex and challenging. In such an environment, they recognised the vital importance of a strengthened and credible NPT, and of the implementation of, and compliance with, all obligations under the Treaty. They reaffirmed the urgent need to safeguard gains made in disarmament, non-proliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and to explore areas of common ground between States Parties in order to identify pathways for the full implementation of the Treaty.

8. In this context, the view was expressed that all States had a responsibility to work together to improve the geopolitical environment and create the conditions conducive to further nuclear disarmament. It was noted that the international security environment was not currently conducive to further progress on nuclear disarmament as the viability and pace of disarmament depended upon the prevailing international security situation. However, it was also stressed that the security environment should not prevent any further steps in nuclear disarmament and that disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control could help reduce current tensions, in tandem with enhanced measures to build confidence and restore trust. In this context, the view was expressed that the full implementation of existing nuclear disarmament obligations and commitments would contribute to improving the global environment, and that such implementation was also necessary to sustain the health of the non-proliferation regime. It was also underscored that commitments made under the Treaty were not subject to conditions and should be implemented without delay.

9. States parties reiterated the importance of disarmament and non-proliferation education as a useful and effective means to advance the goals of the Treaty in support of achieving a world without nuclear weapons. They welcomed continued efforts to implement the recommendations contained in the report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations (A/57/124) regarding the United Nations study on disarmament and non-proliferation education. States parties stressed the need to pass onto younger generations the amassed knowledge and experience of the realities of the use of nuclear weapons.

10. States parties endorsed the fundamental importance of promoting the equal, full and effective participation and leadership of both women and men in nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation, and the peaceful use of nuclear energy. They welcomed the increased participation of women during the session and highlighted the importance of fulfilling commitments under Security Council resolution 1325 (2000), to support actively the participation of female delegates in their own delegations, including through sponsorship programmes. The disproportionate impact of ionizing radiation on women, which should be factored into the discussions in the current review cycle, was also noted.

11. States parties welcomed the interaction with civil society, research institutes and academic organizations during the review cycle and continued engagement with non-governmental organizations in the context of the review process of the Treaty, as well as in the pursuit of nuclear disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation and the peaceful use of nuclear energy objectives.

12. States parties reaffirmed their commitment to the full and effective implementation of Article VI, and that such implementation was essential to the Treaty. They recalled the unequivocal undertaking made by the nuclear-weapon States

to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament to which all States parties were committed under Article VI. In this context, the special responsibility of States possessing the largest nuclear arsenals was mentioned.

13. States parties reiterated that steps in nuclear disarmament should be pursued in ways that promote international stability, peace and security, and that they should be based on the principle of equal and undiminished security for all. In this context, the importance of applying the principles of transparency, verifiability and irreversibility in relation to the implementation of nuclear disarmament obligations was emphasized.

14. Deep concern was expressed at the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons, and the need for all States at all times to comply with applicable international law, including international humanitarian law, was reaffirmed. The view was expressed that awareness of these consequences should underpin all approaches and efforts towards nuclear disarmament. Reference was also made to the International Court of Justice advisory opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, issued at The Hague on 8 July 1996. In this context, the view was expressed that any use or threat of use of nuclear weapons would be inconsistent with fundamental rules of international humanitarian law. This view was not shared by the nuclear-weapon States.

15. Concern was expressed regarding the slow pace of progress towards disarmament and the lack of progress by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals, in accordance with their relevant multilateral obligations. It was stressed that the indefinite extension of the Treaty did not equate to indefinite possession of nuclear weapons. It was also emphasised that the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

16. States parties acknowledged the significant unilateral and bilateral reductions made by nuclear-weapon States in their nuclear arsenals. They nonetheless expressed concern that the total estimated number of nuclear weapons deployed and in stockpiles, including by states not-party to the Treaty, still amounted to more than 15,000. All nuclear-weapon States were called upon to refrain from increasing the number of nuclear warheads in their arsenals. They were encouraged to continue efforts to achieve greater reductions in their nuclear arsenals, including in non-strategic nuclear weapons.

17. States parties welcomed the achievement announced on 5 February 2018 by the United States of America and the Russian Federation of the central limits of the Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (the New START Treaty). Pending further negotiations on arsenal reductions, the United States of America and the Russian Federation were called upon to extend the New START Treaty for a period of up to five years, as provided for in the Treaty's articles. The United States of America and the Russian Federation were also encouraged to commence negotiations on further bilateral arsenal reductions.

18. States parties reiterated the importance of the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles to regional and international security. They called on the Russian Federation and the United States of America to continue active dialogue to preserve the treaty and to resolve implementation issues in accordance with its provisions.

19. Concerns were expressed regarding the continued and perceived growing role of nuclear weapons in military and strategic doctrines that could potentially lower the threshold for nuclear weapon use. It was asserted that some nuclear weapons States' modernisation programmes were not consistent with commitments made under the

NPT to diminish the role of nuclear weapons in military and security concepts, doctrines and policies. Concern was registered at the continued qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons, their delivery systems and related infrastructure, as well as plans to further invest in upgrading, refurbishing or extending the service life of nuclear weapons and related facilities. The nuclear-weapon States expressed the view that modernization programmes were aimed at safety and security, and emphasized the diminished role that nuclear weapons had been assigned in their security doctrines over the past decades, while at the same time also emphasizing the continuing role for credible nuclear deterrence in those doctrines in the prevailing security environment.

20. China stated that it always exercised the utmost restraint in the development of nuclear weapons and limited its capabilities to the minimum level required for national security. It reaffirmed its commitment to a policy of no-first-use, as well as its undertaking not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States.

21. France underlined its unilateral measures regarding disarmament, including the irreversible dismantling of its fissile material production facilities for nuclear weapons, the irreversible dismantling of its nuclear test sites and the total disarmament of the ground-to-ground nuclear component. It reiterated the limited role nuclear weapons played in its defence doctrine.

22. The Russian Federation made reference to the reduction of its nuclear arsenal by more than 85%. It also stated that the role of nuclear weapons in its military doctrine had been reduced and their possible use, as a purely defensive measure, was limited to some extraordinary circumstances.

23. The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland reiterated the limited role nuclear weapons played in its defence doctrine and stressed it maintained a minimum credible deterrent required for national security.

24. The United States of America stated that it had reduced its nuclear stockpile by 88% and capped its deployed strategic forces at their lowest levels since the 1950s. It stated that the role of nuclear weapons had not been expanded in United States' policy, nor had the threshold for their use been lowered.

25. The nuclear-weapon States informed States parties about the outcome of their meeting in Geneva on 24 April 2018, which focused on strategic stability. They stated their intention to continue dialogue in this format.

26. It was strongly asserted that increased transparency builds confidence and trust at regional and international levels, while helping to establish common ground for dialogue and negotiation. Efforts by the nuclear-weapon States to increase transparency related to their nuclear weapon arsenals were welcomed. It was also noted that improving transparency about nuclear policies, plans and doctrines would be a critical confidence-building measure that could help facilitate future arms control initiatives and further negotiated nuclear weapons reductions.

27. States parties recalled their commitments under the Action Plan of the 2010 Review Conference to submit regular reports. It was stressed that transparency and reporting should be firmly embedded in the NPT review cycle to further strengthen it as a useful accountability mechanism for all States parties, including nuclear-weapon States. The need for timely and consistent reporting on nuclear disarmament commitments, without prejudice to national security considerations, including through a common reporting form, was highlighted.

28. The importance of preventing a nuclear detonation, either intentional or accidental was discussed, including as a result of potentially increased vulnerabilities,

particularly from cyber-attacks. In this context, the necessity of exploring options for further reducing the risk of such detonations was considered. Strong support was registered for measures to enhance stability, contribute to crisis management, ease tension and avoid miscalculation. It was noted that such measures could include increased transparency, dialogue and confidence-building measures, and the decreasing of operational readiness of nuclear weapons.

29. In this context, previous commitments by nuclear-weapon States to consider further practical measures to reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons systems in ways that promote international stability and security were recalled. It was suggested that more could be achieved in this area, given the important benefits such actions could have for international peace, security and stability. Nuclear-weapon States were called upon to where possible further reduce alert levels in a concrete and measurable way and within a specified timeframe.

30. States parties stated that a robust and credible verification and compliance mechanism for nuclear disarmament was an effective measure under Article VI of the Treaty, and an essential element for achieving and maintaining a world without nuclear weapons. They welcomed efforts to develop nuclear disarmament verification capabilities. In this regard, States parties welcomed the decision by the General Assembly to establish a Group of Governmental Experts to consider the role of verification in advancing nuclear disarmament and looked forward to its conclusions. They also welcomed the various practical contributions to nuclear disarmament verification, including those made by the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification and the Quad Nuclear Verification Partnership. It was noted that multilateral efforts to develop nuclear disarmament verification should be undertaken with regard to non-proliferation and national security considerations.

31. The urgency of bringing into force the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty as a core element of the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime was underscored. The link between the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the goals and objectives of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was emphasized. All States that have not yet done so were urged to sign and/or ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty without delay, in particular the remaining eight Annex 2 States.

32. It was emphasized that by achieving the cessation of all nuclear weapon test explosions and all other nuclear explosions, by constraining the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and ending the development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons, the Treaty combats both horizontal and vertical proliferation.

33. States parties called on all States to refrain from any action that would defeat the object and purpose of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty pending its entry into force. In this context, some States parties called for the unconditional cessation of all nuclear weapon tests and the closure of all nuclear weapon test sites.

34. States parties further expressed their support for the International Monitoring System as vital to the effectiveness of the Treaty and to maintaining the norm that existing signatures and ratifications establish against nuclear testing.

35. States Parties expressed support for commencement of negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The treaty's potential to contribute to nuclear non-proliferation in all its aspects was also reaffirmed, as well as towards the implementation of Article VI of the Treaty and, ultimately towards a nuclear-weapon-free world.

36. The work being carried out in the context of the 2017–2018 High-level fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT) expert preparatory group was referenced. States

Parties highlighted the potential for this group to build on the work of the previous Group of Governmental Experts in preparing the groundwork for future negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament. They also pointed out that this preparatory group process might help decrease tensions and build confidence, including through its inclusive dialogue and commitment to achieving concrete outcomes. States parties expressed appreciation for the open-ended component of this process that allows the views of the broader membership of the General Assembly to be reflected in the work of the group.

37. The view was expressed that the Conference on Disarmament was the appropriate forum for the negotiation of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other explosive devices on the basis of the Shannon report (CD/1299). It was emphasized that a treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices would strengthen the integrity of the Treaty, and participants called for States parties to fulfil Action 15 of the 2010 Action Plan on an urgent basis. Pending negotiations of such a treaty, nuclear-weapon States and all other relevant States were called upon to maintain or declare moratoriums on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. However, the view was expressed that such a moratorium does not have a clear-cut definition or scope.

38. Multilateralism and multilaterally agreed solutions in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations were considered to provide the only sustainable method of addressing disarmament and international security issues collectively. States Parties noted the importance of abandoning "zero sum" policy in the context of nuclear disarmament. Support was expressed for negotiation and conclusion of a comprehensive convention on nuclear weapons containing a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

39. It was asserted that a progressive and pragmatic approach, taking into account security considerations, was a useful way to achieve further, concrete steps in nuclear disarmament. Reference was also made of the need to utilize existing disarmament mechanisms to pursue nuclear disarmament. In this context, regret was expressed at the on-going stalemate in the Conference on Disarmament. However, States parties welcomed the 19 February 2018 decision of the Conference on the creation of subsidiary bodies to reach understanding on areas of commonalities, deepen technical discussions and broaden areas of agreement, and consider effective measures, including legal instruments for negotiation.

40. The adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) on 7 July 2017 was supported by a number of States parties who informed about the ratification process and status of this treaty. It was asserted that the TPNW represented an effective measure under Article VI of the NPT by creating a legally binding prohibition on nuclear weapons. It was stressed that the TPNW complemented the NPT and was designed to strengthen existing disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation regimes.

41. Other States parties expressed their opposition to the TPNW, emphasizing the crucial link between progress on disarmament and the international security environment. It was asserted that the TPNW would not contribute to the reduction or limitation of nuclear weapons. These states noted that the TPNW does not reflect customary international law and thus could bind only its signatories. Concerns were expressed that the TPNW could create an alternative and contrary standard to the NPT.

42. States parties discussed the relevance of security assurances by nuclear-weapon States in light of the objectives of the Treaty. The legitimate interest of non-nuclear-weapon States parties, pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, in receiving

unequivocal security assurances from nuclear weapons States against the use or the threat of use of nuclear weapons was raised. Some states noted that the respect for the provisions of the 1994 Budapest Memorandum was important for the credibility of such security assurances. The view was expressed that the current Review cycle represented an opportunity to reaffirm and strengthen security assurances to enhance the credibility and legitimacy of the non-proliferation regime.

43. States parties called upon the nuclear-weapon States to reaffirm the security assurances provided to non-nuclear weapon States parties, as contained in United Nations Security Council resolution 984 (1995) and which were recalled in resolutions 1887 (2009) and 2310 (2016). Reference was made to the limited and conditional nature of these assurances, and the need for universal, effective, unconditional, non-discriminatory and irrevocable security assurances, including through the negotiation of a legally-binding instrument, was highlighted. The establishment of a subsidiary body on the issue at the 2020 Review Conference was called for.

44. All concerned States were encouraged to ratify nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties and their relevant protocols and to work constructively to bring about the entry into force of the relevant legally binding protocols of all such nuclear-weapon-free zones treaties, which include negative security assurances. The concerned States were encouraged to review any related reservations.

45. The presentation by the Foreign Minister of Japan of the "Building bridges to effective nuclear disarmament — recommendations for the 2020 review process of the Non-Proliferation Treaty", proposed by the Group of Eminent Persons for Substantive Advancement of Nuclear Disarmament, was welcomed. Three key points from the group's recommendations were highlighted: first, the need for transparency to build confidence and avoid distrust and misunderstanding; second, the importance of an effective verification mechanism in realizing the total elimination of nuclear weapons; and, third, the necessity of interactive discussions between all States parties to address "hard questions".

46. States parties emphasized that IAEA safeguards were a fundamental component of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, played an indispensable role in the implementation of the Treaty and helped to create an environment conducive to nuclear cooperation.

47. States parties reaffirmed that the IAEA was the competent authority responsible for verifying and assuring, in accordance with the Statute of IAEA and the IAEA safeguards system, compliance by States parties with the safeguards agreements undertaken in fulfilment of their obligations under Article III, paragraph 1, of the Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. They also stressed that nothing should be done to undermine the authority of the IAEA in this regard. States parties that have concerns regarding non-compliance with the safeguards agreements of the Treaty by the States parties should direct such concerns, along with supporting evidence and information, to IAEA to consider, investigate, draw conclusions and decide on necessary actions in accordance with its mandate.

48. States parties expressed concern with cases of non-compliance with the Treaty and called on those States non-compliant to move promptly to full compliance with their obligations. States parties also underscored the importance in complying with the non-proliferation obligations, addressing all non-compliance matters in order to uphold the Treaty's integrity and the authority of the IAEA safeguards. They also underscored the importance of resolving all cases of non-compliance with safeguards obligations in full conformity with the IAEA's Statute and the respective legal obligations of States parties and called on all States to extend their cooperation in this

regard. The primary responsibility of the Security Council in cases of non-compliance was also underlined.

49. States parties recalled the importance of the application of IAEA safeguards pursuant to comprehensive safeguards agreements based on INFCIRC/153 (Corrected) to all source and special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities in the States parties in accordance with Article III, paragraph 1, of the Treaty for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. They welcomed the fact that 174 States parties have in force comprehensive safeguards agreements with IAEA. The non-nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty that have yet to bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements were urged to do so as soon as possible and without further delay.

50. States parties reaffirmed that the implementation of comprehensive safeguards agreements pursuant to Article III, paragraph 1, of the Treaty should be designed to provide for verification by IAEA of the correctness and completeness of a State's declarations so that there is a credible assurance of the non-diversion of nuclear material from declared activities and of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities.

51. States parties recognized that comprehensive safeguards agreements based on INFCIRC/153 (Corrected) have been successful in their main focus of providing assurance regarding declared nuclear material and have also provided a limited level of assurance regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. States parties noted that implementation of the measures specified in the Model Additional Protocol (INFCIRC/540 (Corrected)) provided, in an effective and efficient manner, increased confidence about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in a State as a whole and that those measures were an integral part of IAEA safeguards.

52. States parties emphasized that it was the sovereign decision of any State to conclude an additional protocol but that, once in force or applied provisionally, the additional protocol was a legal obligation. The fact that 132 States had brought additional protocols into force was welcomed. States parties that had not yet done so were encouraged to conclude and to bring into force additional protocols as soon as possible and to implement them provisionally pending their entry into force. The importance of universalization of comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols was also stressed. States parties welcomed the assistance provided to States, including through IAEA, to conclude, bring into force and implement comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols. They encouraged the IAEA to further facilitate and assist the States parties upon request in the conclusion, entry into force and implementation of comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols. The consideration by IAEA and States parties of specific measures that would promote the universalization of comprehensive safeguards agreements and adherence to additional protocols was also welcomed.

53. States parties considered that, in the case of a State party with a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol in force, the comprehensive safeguards agreement and the additional protocol represented the verification standard for that State, which enabled IAEA to provide increased assurances regarding both the non-diversion of declared nuclear material and the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in the State as a whole. It was also noted that a comprehensive safeguards agreement, together with an additional protocol, represented the current verification standard pursuant to Article III of the Treaty.

54. The need to distinguish between legal obligations and voluntary confidence-building measures and to ensure that such voluntary measures were not turned into

legal safeguards obligations was emphasized. It was also noted that additional measures related to safeguards should not affect the rights of the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty.

55. States parties stressed the importance of IAEA exercising fully its mandate and authority in accordance with its Statute to provide assurances on the non-diversion of declared nuclear material and the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in accordance with respective comprehensive safeguards agreements and, where relevant, additional protocols.

56. States parties welcomed the fact that 63 States parties had accepted to amend their small quantities protocols and 7 other States parties had rescinded their small quantities protocols. They urged all States parties with small quantities protocols that had not yet done so to amend or rescind them, as appropriate, as soon as possible.

57. States parties called for the wider application of safeguards to peaceful nuclear facilities in the nuclear-weapon States, under the relevant voluntary-offer safeguards agreements, in the most economic and practical way possible, taking into account the availability of IAEA resources, and stressed that comprehensive safeguards and additional protocols should be applied universally once the complete elimination of nuclear weapons had been achieved.

58. States parties stressed the importance of maintaining and observing fully the principle of confidentiality regarding all information related to implementation of safeguards in accordance with safeguards agreements, the Agency's Statute and its confidentiality regime.

59. States parties noted the considerable increase in the Agency's safeguards responsibilities and the financial constraints under which the IAEA safeguards were functioning and stressed the need to ensure that the Agency continue to have the political, technical and financial support necessary to effectively fulfil its responsibility to apply safeguards as required under Article III of the Treaty.

60. States parties emphasized the importance of maintaining the credibility, effectiveness and integrity of IAEA safeguards and stressed that safeguards implementation should remain technically based, effective, transparent, non-discriminatory and objective. They supported the further strengthening of IAEA safeguards. In that context, support was expressed for the State-level concept as an important development aimed at strengthening the effectiveness and efficiency of IAEA safeguards. States parties welcomed the continued open dialogue on safeguards matters between the IAEA Secretariat and States to maintain and foster transparency and confidence in the implementation of safeguards and noted the Agency's work on updating, developing and implementing State-level safeguards approaches.

61. States parties reaffirmed that IAEA safeguards should be assessed and evaluated regularly. Decisions adopted by the IAEA Board of Governors aimed at further strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of IAEA safeguards should be supported and implemented by all States parties.

62. States parties welcomed additional technical and financial contributions by States to help IAEA to meet its safeguards responsibilities, and to enhance the related technology base, including the modernization of its Safeguards Analytical Laboratories. They noted the assistance provided to IAEA by Member States and relevant organizations, including through the Member State Support Programme, to facilitate capacity-building, including related research and development, and the implementation of safeguards. They also welcomed that such assistance would continue to be provided to that end. States parties encouraged, within the framework of the IAEA Statute, the further development of a robust, flexible, adaptive and cost-effective international technology base for advanced safeguards through cooperation

among Member States and with IAEA. They also encouraged the States concerned to promote early consultations with IAEA, at the appropriate stage, on safeguards-relevant aspects of new nuclear facilities in order to facilitate future safeguards implementation.

63. States parties recognized that the responsibility for nuclear security within a State rests entirely with that State. They recalled that, when developing nuclear energy, including nuclear power, the use of nuclear energy must be accompanied by appropriate and effective levels of nuclear security, consistent with States' national legislation and respective international obligations.

64. States parties stressed the importance of the effective physical protection of all nuclear material and nuclear facilities. They called upon all States, within their responsibility, to achieve and maintain highly effective nuclear security, including the physical protection of nuclear and other radioactive material during use, storage and transport and of the associated facilities at all stages in their life cycle and the protection of sensitive information. In that regard they encouraged all States, in their efforts to strengthen nuclear security, to take into account and apply, as appropriate, the IAEA Nuclear Security Series publications.

65. States parties reaffirmed the central role of IAEA in strengthening the nuclear security framework globally and in coordinating international activities in the field of nuclear security.

66. States parties welcomed the International Conference on Nuclear Security: Commitments and Actions, held in 2016, the Ministerial Declaration adopted at that Conference and the fact that IAEA would continue to organize international conferences on nuclear security every three years.

67. States parties encouraged IAEA to continue to assist States upon request in strengthening their national regulatory controls on nuclear material, including the establishment and maintenance of State systems to account for and control nuclear material. They also encouraged States to make further use of assistance in the field of nuclear security, where such assistance was needed and requested, including though the IAEA services in the field of nuclear security, such as the Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plans, International Nuclear Security Advisory Service and International Physical Protection Advisory Service missions. The Joint Statement on Strengthening Nuclear Security Implementation (INFCIRC/869) was noted, and States parties that had not yet done so were encouraged to subscribe to it.

68. States parties welcomed the recent accessions to the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, encouraged all parties to the Convention and the Amendment to implement fully their obligations thereunder, and further encouraged States that had not yet done so to become parties to the Convention and its Amendment as soon as possible. States parties also encouraged States that had not yet done so to become parties to the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism as soon as possible.

69. States parties noted the work of IAEA in support of the efforts of States to combat trafficking in nuclear material, including the activities that it had undertaken to provide for an enhanced exchange of information and the continued maintenance of its incident and trafficking database. They called upon all States to improve their national capabilities to detect, deter and disrupt illicit trafficking in nuclear material throughout their territories, in accordance with their national legislation and relevant international obligations, and called upon those States parties in a position to do so to work to enhance international partnerships and capacity-building in that regard. They also called upon States to establish and enforce effective domestic controls to prevent

the proliferation of nuclear weapons in accordance with their relevant international legal obligations.

70. States parties expressed concerns regarding the threat of terrorism and the risk that non-State actors might acquire nuclear weapons and their means of delivery. In that connection, they recalled the obligation of all States to implement fully Security Council resolution 1540 (2004).

71. States parties reiterated the need to ensure that their nuclear-related exports did not directly or indirectly assist the development of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and that such exports were in full conformity with the objectives and purposes of the Treaty as stipulated, in particular, in Articles I, II and III, as well as the decision on principles and objectives of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament adopted in 1995 by the Review and Extension Conference.

72. The role of national rules and regulations in ensuring that States parties were able to give effect to their commitments with respect to the transfer of nuclear and nuclear-related dual-use items to all States, taking into account Articles I, II and III of the Treaty, and States parties, also fully respecting Article IV, was recognized. In that context, States parties that had not yet done so were encouraged to establish and implement effective national rules and regulations and to make use of multilaterally negotiated and agreed guidelines and understandings in developing their own national export controls.

73. States parties underlined that any supplier arrangement should continue to be transparent and to ensure that in formulating export guidelines they did not hamper the development of nuclear energy for peaceful uses by States parties, in conformity with Articles I, II, III and IV of the Treaty.

74. Concern was expressed regarding limitations and restrictions on exports to developing countries of nuclear material, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes, which were considered to be inconsistent with the provisions of the Treaty. In that context, a call was made for the immediate removal of any restrictions or limitations placed on peaceful uses of nuclear energy that were incompatible with the provisions of the Treaty. A view was also expressed that effective export controls were essential for facilitating the fullest possible cooperation regarding the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in conformity with the Treaty.

75. States parties recalled that the 1995 Extension and Review Conference had noted that new supply arrangements for the transfer of source or special fissionable material or equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material to non-nuclear-weapon States should require, as a necessary precondition, acceptance of full-scope safeguards and international legally binding commitments not to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

76. States parties reaffirmed the conviction that the further establishment of internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned enhanced global and regional peace and security, strengthened the nuclear non-proliferation regime and contributed to realizing the objectives of nuclear disarmament. They reaffirmed their support for internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones established on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned and in accordance with the Guidelines adopted by the UN Disarmament Commission in 1999.

77. States parties recognized the continuing contributions that the Antarctic Treaty, the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco), the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of

Rarotonga), the Treaty on the South-East Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (Bangkok Treaty), the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Pelindaba Treaty) and the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia (Semipalatinsk Treaty) and Mongolia's nuclear-weapon-free status in accordance with the parallel declarations adopted by the nuclear-weapon States and Mongolia on 17 September 2012, were making towards attaining the objectives of nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation. They also welcomed the increased cooperation among the members of the zones. The role of specialized bodies, such as the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and Caribbean (OPANAL), in articulating common positions and joint actions on nuclear disarmament was emphasized.

78. States parties emphasized the potential of regional approaches to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. They noted the role of regional cooperation in terms of nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and peaceful uses. In that context, reference was made to the regional dialogues on the Treaty held in Mexico City, Addis Ababa and Jakarta, in the context of the preparation for the 2018 session of the Preparatory Committee, on the initiative of the Chair and the host States.

79. States parties welcomed the progress made towards ratification by the nuclear-weapon States of the relevant protocols to nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaties and the continuing efforts in that regard of the parties to the Bangkok Treaty and the nuclear-weapon States with respect to the Protocol to that Treaty. States parties looked forward to the nuclear-weapon States signing and ratifying the Protocol to that Treaty as soon as possible. They welcomed the signature and ratification by nuclear-weapon States of the Protocol to the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia.

80. Reference was made to the importance of the nuclear-weapon States that had not yet done so signing and ratifying the relevant protocols to the treaties establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones, and of their bringing into effect the security assurances provided under nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaties and their protocols. That such assurances should be unconditional and non-discriminatory was highlighted. It was noted that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones is not a substitute for nuclear disarmament and the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

81. The importance of establishing further nuclear-weapon-free zones where they did not exist, especially in the Middle East, was endorsed.

82. States parties reaffirmed their support for the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and recalled the affirmation of its goals and objectives by the 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences. They reaffirmed that the 1995 resolution remained valid until its goals and objectives had been achieved and that the 1995 resolution, which had been sponsored by the depositary States of the Treaty, was an essential element of the outcome of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and of the basis on which the Treaty was extended indefinitely without a vote in 1995. States parties recalled their resolve to undertake, individually and collectively, all measures necessary for its prompt implementation.

83. Disappointment was expressed at the long delay in the implementation of the 1995 resolution, as was dismay that the 2015 Review Conference was unable to achieve consensus on measures regarding the process to establish a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction. Similar disappointment was also expressed over the inability to convene a conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction in 2012, as endorsed at the 2010 Review Conference. Strong support was expressed for the convening of this conference as soon as possible, in accordance with the agreed outcomes of the Review Conferences of 1995, 2000, 2010.

84. There were calls, including on the United Nations Secretary-General, to undertake efforts to convene a conference aimed at launching a process to negotiate and conclude a legally binding Treaty to establish a Middle East Zone free of nuclear and all other weapons of mass destruction. The opinion was also expressed that the achievement of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction remains a priority for States, but can only occur through direct dialogue among all States of the region and on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region.

85. The special responsibility of the sponsors of the 1995 resolution, together with that of the States of the region, as well as that of all States parties, to implement the resolution and support efforts leading to the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, was emphasized.

86. It was noted that States of the region have a responsibility to undertake efforts, including through direct regional dialogue, to pursue the political and practical steps leading to such a zone. It was recalled that relevant steps and confidence building measures would contribute to the realization of the objectives of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East. It was also strongly stated that all states should refrain from any measures that precluded the achievement of those objectives. While it was stressed that the realization of these objectives should not be subject to preconditions, it was also pointed out that conditions conducive to the establishment of Middle East Zone free of nuclear and all other weapons of mass destruction should be actively promoted.

87. There were also calls for the establishment of a subsidiary body to Main Committee II of the 2020 Review Conference to assess the implementation of the Resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and reaffirmed by the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, as well as the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions of the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty.

88. Strong support was reiterated for the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action as an important contribution to non-proliferation regime and a successful, multilateral endeavour endorsed by UN Security Council resolution 2231 (2015). States parties underscored the vital role of the IAEA in verifying and monitoring the implementation by the Islamic Republic of Iran of its nuclear-related commitments under the Plan. The strict adherence by the Islamic Republic of Iran to all of its nuclear-related commitments under the Plan and its full cooperation with IAEA to achieve international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of the Iranian nuclear programme was emphasised. The need for all parties concerned to maintain their constructive engagement so as to ensure that progress was made towards the full implementation of the Plan was also stressed.

89. Concern was expressed about the continuous lack of cooperation and progress on the long-outstanding safeguards issues concerning the Syrian Arab Republic. The Syrian Arab Republic was called upon to remedy its non-compliance with its safeguards obligations and to cooperate fully with IAEA to resolve all outstanding safeguards issues. The Syrian Arab Republic stated that it was committed to the implementation of its comprehensive safeguards agreement.

90. States parties reaffirmed that the nuclear and ballistic missile programmes of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea were a matter of grave concern, continued to pose a serious threat to global and regional security, were a serious challenge to the Treaty and undermined the global non-proliferation regime. States parties strongly urged the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes as well as all other existing weapons mass

destruction and ballistic missile programmes, in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner, as required by relevant Security Council resolutions.

91. States parties reaffirmed that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea cannot have the status of a nuclear-weapon State in accordance with the Treaty, reiterated the international community's opposition to the possession by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of nuclear weapons and urged the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to return, at an early date, to the Treaty and IAEA safeguards, to come into full compliance with the Treaty and cooperate promptly with IAEA in the full and effective implementation of IAEA comprehensive safeguards. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea was also urged to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

92. The importance of maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, as well as the peaceful and diplomatic resolution of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea nuclear issue was stressed. States parties noted the recent announcement by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to suspend nuclear tests and ballistic missile launches and to close its nuclear test site as an encouraging development, but stressed the need for further, concrete steps by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea towards its complete denuclearization. States parties welcomed the 27 April 2018 Inter-Korean summit and the "Panmunjeom Declaration" as a positive development for the Korean Peninsula. They expressed hope for further progress at the United States of America-the Democratic People's Republic of Korea summit. It was also stressed that all States must fully implement the relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions until the Democratic People's Republic of Korea abandons its nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes, and all other existing weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile programmes, in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner, as required by those resolutions.

93. States parties recalled that nothing in the Treaty should be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I, II, III and IV of the Treaty. They stressed that this right constituted a fundamental pillar of the Treaty and recalled that each country's choices and decisions in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be respected without jeopardizing its policies or international cooperation agreements and arrangements for peaceful uses of nuclear energy, including its fuel cycle policies.

94. States parties recalled their undertaking to facilitate, and their right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. They called upon States parties to the Treaty in a position to do to cooperate in contributing alone or together with other States parties or international organizations to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, with due consideration for their development needs, in accordance with Article IV.

95. States parties recalled that in all activities designed to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, preferential treatment should be given to the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, taking the needs of developing countries, in particular, into account.

96. States parties emphasized that transfers of nuclear technology and international cooperation among States parties in conformity with Articles I, II, III and IV of the Treaty should be encouraged, and that they would be facilitated by eliminating undue constraints that might impede such cooperation.

97. States parties noted that, when developing nuclear energy, including nuclear power, the use of nuclear energy must be accompanied at all stages by commitments to, and ongoing implementation of, safeguards as well as high levels of safety and security, consistent with States parties' national legislation and respective international obligations.

98. States parties recognized the indispensable role of science and technology, including nuclear science and technology, in achieving social and economic development for all States parties. They underlined the need for enhanced international cooperation, including through the efforts of the IAEA, to expand the extent that nuclear sciences and applications are utilized to improve the quality of life and the well-being of the peoples of the world including the achievement of the goals of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (A/RES/70/1), as well as the Paris Agreement on Climate Change.

99. States parties commended the IAEA's contribution to peace and development under the motto "Atoms for Peace and Development". They underlined the role of IAEA in assisting developing States parties in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy through the development and delivery of effective and efficient programmes in areas such as health and nutrition, food and agriculture, water and environment and industrial applications. In addition, they noted with appreciation the IAEA's response to emergencies such as the Ebola and Zika virus disease outbreaks as well as natural disasters. In this context, States parties welcomed the convening by the IAEA, on 28-30 November 2018, of the Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Science and Technology: Addressing Current and Emerging Development Challenges.

100. States parties acknowledged the development of competent human resources as a key component for the sustainable use of nuclear energy and underlined the importance of collaboration with the IAEA, as well as among States parties, in that regard.

101. States parties acknowledged the central role of the IAEA Technical Cooperation Programme (TCP) in enhancing the application of nuclear science and technology in many States parties, in particular, in those that are developing countries, and recognized the Technical Cooperation Fund (TCF) as the most important mechanism for the implementation of the IAEA TCP. They stressed the need to make every effort and to take practical steps to ensure that IAEA resources for technical cooperation activities are sufficient, assured and predictable to meet the objectives set out in Article II of the IAEA's Statute.

102. States parties welcomed the progress made in the construction of the new IAEA laboratory buildings and infrastructure under both Renovation of the Nuclear Applications Laboratories (ReNuAL) and ReNuAL+ projects, which are central to the IAEA's efforts to provide opportunities for training in and research and development of nuclear applications in broader areas, thus enhancing the access of States parties, in particular developing countries, to the peaceful uses of nuclear technology. They welcomed the contributions made by countries to this project and called upon States parties in a position to do so to make appropriate contributions to support the completion of the renovation of these Laboratories in Seibersdorf.

103. States parties acknowledged that the IAEA Peaceful Uses Initiative (PUI) has become instrumental in mobilizing extra budgetary contributions to support technical cooperation and other unfunded projects of the IAEA aimed at promoting broad development goals in Member States and to allow the IAEA to be more flexible and quicker in responding to evolving priorities of IAEA Member States, as well as to unexpected needs or unforeseen emergency events. They encouraged States parties in a position to do so to make additional contributions, while welcoming the contributions made by countries through the PUI.

104. States parties acknowledged that each State party has the right to define its national energy policy and that nuclear power is expected to continue playing an important role in the energy mix of many countries around the world. They called on the IAEA to continue to support interested Member States in building their national capacities in the operation of nuclear power plants and in embarking on new nuclear power programmes.

105. States parties noted developments on further minimization of highly enriched uranium in civilian stocks and use of low enriched uranium. States parties concerned were encouraged, on a voluntary basis, to continue these efforts where technically and economically feasible.

106. States parties noted developments in relation to multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle, including the significant progress made on the establishment of the IAEA Low Enriched Uranium Bank in Kazakhstan. It was noted that the creation of mechanisms for assurance of nuclear fuel supply should not affect State parties' rights under the Treaty and should be without prejudice to their national fuel cycle policies, while tackling the technical, legal and economic complexities surrounding these issues, including, in this regard, the requirement of IAEA full scope safeguards.

107. States parties recognized that the primary responsibility for nuclear safety rests with individual States and reaffirmed the central role of the IAEA in promoting international cooperation on nuclear safety-related matters, including through the establishment of nuclear safety standards.

108. States parties that had not yet done so were called upon to become party to the Convention on Nuclear Safety (CNS), the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, and the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management.

109. States parties welcomed the work of the IAEA, including in the provision of international peer review services, the support to the regulatory bodies and other relevant areas of the infrastructure of Member States. They noted with appreciation the IAEA's continuous work to strengthen nuclear, radiation, transport and waste safety and emergency preparedness and response building upon the IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety and the experience of its implementation by Member States, the IAEA Report on the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant accident, and the Vienna Declaration on Nuclear Safety on Principles for the Implementation of the Objective of the CNS to Prevent Accidents and Mitigate Radiological Consequences.

110. States parties underlined the need to transport radioactive materials consistent with relevant international standards of safety, security and the environment protection, and to continue communication between shipping and coastal States for the purpose of confidence-building and addressing concerns regarding transport safety, security and emergency preparedness.

111. States parties recalled that each State party, in exercising its national sovereignty, had the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decided that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the Treaty had jeopardized the supreme interest of its country, in accordance with Article X, paragraph 1, of the Treaty.

112. It was underscored that, under international law, a withdrawing party would remain responsible for violations of the Treaty committed prior to its withdrawal. It was further underscored that withdrawal should not affect any right, obligation or legal situation between the withdrawing State and each of the other States parties created through implementation of the Treaty prior to withdrawal, including those relating to IAEA safeguards. It was further considered that nuclear supplier States should be encouraged to exercise their right to incorporate dismantling and/or return

clauses or fallback safeguards in the event of withdrawal into contracts or arrangements concluded with the withdrawing States, and to adopt standard clauses for that purpose.

113. States parties reaffirmed the purpose of the review process as set out in the relevant decisions of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the 2000 Review Conference.

114. States parties exchanged views on a number of specific proposals to further strengthen the review process, including the establishment of a working group at the 2020 Review Conference to provide a dedicated forum for advancing and debating ideas, and to allow States Parties to reach informed conclusions and compromises on changes that could best enhance the review process. Proposals also included an interactive session during Preparatory Committee sessions for discussion of national reports, intersessional mechanisms devoted to specific issues such as the implementation of Article VI, a more flexible approach to Review Conference outcome documents, greater connectivity between the Preparatory Committee sessions and the Review Conference, and greater engagement with civil society, academia and industry.

115. There was recognition of the need to ensure efficiency, effectiveness, coordination and continuity throughout the review cycle, including through the early nominations of Chairs of the Preparatory Committee. There were calls for a prompt nomination of the President of the 2020 Review Conference. There were also calls encouraging past and incumbent Presidents and Chairs to be available for consultations with the incoming President and Chairs regarding practical matters relating to their responsibilities; and continuing outreach and the practice of holding regional dialogues prior to each session. The need to establish a dedicated resource to ensure continuity throughout the review cycle was highlighted.